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I.  INTRODUCTION 
American multinational corporations (MNCs) are immensely wealthy, powerful, 
and influential entities.1 Despite their stereotypical image as greedy and uncaring, if 
not outright villainous, American MNCs have become increasingly generous at 
home and abroad.2 Early corporations were strictly limited to pursue only those 
purposes for which the corporation was expressly created.3  Charitable relief, as one 
can imagine, was not a common purpose for which corporations were formed in 
early America. Toward the end of the nineteenth-century, corporations began to 
lobby state legislatures to ease the application of the ultra vires doctrine with respect 
to incidental activities that were not diametrically contrary to the entity’s stated 
purpose.4  
Two landmark twentieth-century cases have had an enduring impact on 
American jurisprudence regarding the role and purpose of corporations.  In Dodge v. 
Ford Motor Co., the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that although incidental 
humanitarian expenditures are permissible, the ultimate purpose of a corporation is 
to increase the wealth of its shareholders.5  Three decades later in A.P Smith Mfg. 
Co. v. Barlow, a New Jersey appellate court ruled against a group of shareholders 
who challenged their board of directors’ decision to make a charitable contribution 
to Princeton University.6 The two cases highlight the fine-line corporation directors 
                                                          
 1 See  Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human 
Rights, 20 BERKELY J. INT’L. L. 45, 46 (2002) (“Multiple layers of control and ownership 
insulate individuals from a sense of responsibility for corporate actions. The enormous power 
of multinational corporations enables them to inflict greater harms, while their economic and 
political clout renders them difficult to regulate.”).  
 2 See 10 Companies that Gave [ the] Most Cash to Charity in 2011, THE HUFFINGTON 
POST (July 24, 2012, 3:16 PM),  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/24/companies-gave-
most-charity-2011_n_1699157.html. 
 3 LEE HARRIS, MASTERING CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTITIES 100 (2009). An 
activity beyond the established power of the corporation would be deemed ultra vires and thus 
void.   
 4 Id. at 101 (discussing the emergence of general incorporation statues).    
 5 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459 (1919) ( “A business corporation is organized 
and carried on primary for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be 
employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to 
attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or 
to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other 
purposes”). The court deferred to the business judgment rule in approving Ford’s decision to 
vertically integrate the company’s operations. The court ruled, however, that withholding a 
special dividend in order to advanced Ford’s philanthropic goals was antithetical to the 
business judgment rule and the shareholder primacy norm. 
 6 A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145 (1953). The court allowed the charitable 
donation because  the company’s president argued that it was made with the intent to increase 
the firm’s future profitability. Most states have since enacted statutes authorizing corporate 
charitable donations, although there is variation regarding whether and to what extent  the 
donation can be linked to a deemed future benefit to the corporation. For a comparison of the 
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must walk when structuring charitable initiatives. Reading them and similar cases 
together produces the general rule that, a corporation is permitted to donate a portion 
of its profits to charity, but not in a manner or amount that would violate its 
directors’ fiduciary duties to investors.  
Along with making donations to eligible charities7, American MNCs have begun 
to embrace the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR).8 Just what is CSR? 
That question cannot be answered definitively since CSR is an amorphous concept. 
Generally CSR is a form of corporate self-regulation through which corporations 
consider the ethical and environmental effects of a given choice of action.9   Despite 
good-faith efforts by many American MNCs to implement CSR policies, labor and 
human rights violations persist in the global supply chain of many sectors of the U.S. 
economy.10 From hi-tech to mining, apparel to agricultural, many commercial 
products sold by American MNCs have been tarnished by abusive production 
methods in developing nations.11 Historically, the American government has paid 
scant attention to the problem while foreign host nations and foreign business 
entities eagerly exploit cheap and even slave labor sources.12 Even when the U.S. 
                                                          
pertinent provisions from Delaware, California, New York and Pennsylvania see WILLIAM 
KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, 
AND CORPORATIONS 268-69 (7th ed. 2009). Specifically Delaware’s version of the statute 
states the following: “Every corporation created under this chapter shall have power to: (9) 
Make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational purposes, and 
in time of war or other national emergency in aid thereof;” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) 
(West 2012).      
 7 See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2012).  
 8 See generally Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of 
Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705 (2002) (advocating the conception of 
corporations as both economic and social entities). 
 9 See id. at 721 (“The general corporate social responsibility concern tend to be a 
seemingly pessimistic preoccupation with the potential negative social and environmental 
effects that may be created by economic entities in their pursuit of economic returns.”).    
 10 See Kevin Kolben, Labor Rights as Human Rights?, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 449 (2010), 
(discussing of the emerging scholarship of labor rights issues couched in human rights terms).    
 11 See Maria Ellinikos, American MNCs Continue to Profit from the Use of Forced and 
Slave Labor Begging the Question: Should America Take a Cue from Germany?, 35 COLUM. 
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 10-11 (2001) (contrasting the willingness of post-WWII German courts 
to hold German businesses accountable for exploiting slave labor under the Nazi regime with 
the reluctance of their American judicial counterparts to hold American MNCs liable for using 
slave or forced labor without concrete supporting evidence that the American MNC directly 
participated or cooperated in the abusive practice).   
 12 Id. at 1; see also E. Christopher Johnson Jr., Michigan Lawyers in the Fight Against 
Slavery, 91-JUN MICH. B J. 22-24 (2012) (discussing  Ambassador-at-Large to Monitor and 
Combat Trafficking in Persons Luis CdeBaca’s recent testimony before Congress on the use 
of forced labor in the production of rubber, cotton, chocolate, coffee, tin, and steel). While not 
the focus of conservatively estimated to be at least 10,000 according to Kevin Bales et al., 
Hidden Slaves Forced Labor in the United States, 23 BERKELEY J. INT L. 47-48 (2005). The 
article lists, Chinese, Mexicans, and Vietnamese as the top three ethnic groups of forced 
laborers inside the U.S. The article apportions forced laborers in the U.S. into the following 
sectors:  prostitution and sex services (46%), domestic service (27%), agriculture (10%), 
sweatshop/factory (5%), and restaurant and hotel work (4%). But see The Foreign Corrupt 
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ratifies international human and/or labor rights treaties, it routinely attaches 
“reservations, understandings, and declarations” (referred to as RUDs) which 
effectively limit the domestic application of the treaty.13     
Non-governmental organizations have long championed the cause, however, the 
utility of international treaties and pledges (such as the U.N.’s “Global Compact”)14 
in protecting human and labor rights are marred by their unenforceability and 
voluntariness.15 Their unenforceability stems from the lack of an enforcement 
mechanism in the various initiatives. But for the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, limiting the potential labor and human rights claims 
litigants may pursue in American courts under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),16 the 
ATS would serve as a deterrent to corporations that would otherwise be willing to 
profit irresponsibly. The global recession and accompanying fiscal cliff debt crises 
increase the general apathy of corporate shareholders who continue to seek profits in 
a time of financial uncertainty.17 Some developing nations, further pressed by weak 
demand for their exports, have shown a willingness to forgo strengthening human 
and labor rights policies in order to continue the flow of foreign direct investment.18  
                                                          
Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §  78dd-2 (West 2012) (prohibiting corporations from engaging in 
acts of bribery with foreign officials).  
 13 Amy C. Harfeld, Oh Righteous Delinquent One: The United States’ International 
Human Rights Double Standard—Explanation, Examples, and Avenues for Change, 4 N.Y. 
CITY L. REV. 59, 75-76 (2001) (“There are many explanations for these RUDs, some of which 
point towards America's sense of international political and legal superiority; all of which 
serve to keep the United States free from the grasp of international law.”). 
 14 U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon: “The Global Compact asks companies to 
embrace universal principles and to partner with the United Nations. It has grown to become a 
critical platform for the UN to engage effectively with enlightened global business.” The Ten 
Principles of the Global Compact are available at 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html; see also Elisa Westfield, 
Globalization, Governance, and Multinational Enterprise Responsibility: Corporate Codes of 
Conduct in the 21st Century, 42 VA. J. Int’l L.  1075, 1091 (2002) (noting that the Global 
Compact lacks an enforcement mechanism. Thus limiting the U.N. to persuasion and media 
embarrassment to enforce the Compact). 
 15 But cf. Tim Baines, Integration of Corporate Social Responsibility through 
International Voluntary Initiatives, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 223 (discussing options 
for increasing the effectiveness of voluntary initiatives including consolidating 
complementary initiatives, using an ombudsman to monitor grievances, and a narrow tailoring 
of existing initiatives).  
 16 Vanessa R. Waldref, The Alien Tort Statute after Sosa: A Viable Tool in the Campaign 
to End Child Labor?, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 160, 161 (2010). In Sosa, the Court held 
that ATS claims must involve violations of norms that are “universally accepted, specific, and 
concrete.” It is argued that that standard begs the question because of the divergent 
international acceptance of human rights norms.  
 17 See Robert Sprague & Aaron Lyttle, Shareholder Primacy and the Business Judgment 
Rule: Arguments for Expanded Corporate Democracy, 16 STAN J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 27 (2010) 
(“Shareholder empowerment may force directors to focus on short-term returns at the expense 
of other constituencies, interfering with the goals of corporate social responsibility.”).  
 18 See, e.g., Ellinikos, supra note 11, at 7 (discussing the numerous allegations of human 
and labor rights violations leveled against the ruling Burmese military junta in connection 
with oil & gas partnerships with the former American MNC Unocal). 
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Until the end of the twentieth century, the predominant view in America was that 
a corporation’s sole duty was to supply wealth to its shareholders.19 The idea that a 
corporation owes a broader duty to all of its stakeholders has gained ground based 
largely on the emerging international recognition of human rights norms.20 
Increasingly American MNCs have opted to voluntarily create and implement CSR 
policies for moral, economic, and political reasons.21 While charitable donations 
made to exempt organizations are expressly deductible under section 170 of the 
Internal Revenue Code22, the same might not be true for a given CSR expenditure. In 
order to claim a tax deduction, a taxpayer must be able to point to a section of the 
Internal Revenue Code containing the magic words, “There shall be allowed as a 
deduction…”23 for the given outlay.  
Therefore, many American MNCs may be reluctant to proceed with a meaningful 
CSR program without a corresponding tax subsidy; a subsidy in the sense that a tax 
deduction reduces the after tax cost of a given outlay by subtracting the cost of the 
outlay from the taxpayer’s gross income. For example, imagine that student “A” paid 
$1,000 in interest on her student loans during 2012. Also imagine that she was 
fortunate enough to secure employment placing her in the 25% marginal tax bracket. 
The interest payment would be fully deductible under section 22124. The payment 
would reduce her tax bill by $1,000 x (25%) or $250. Her after tax cost of the 
interest payment is $750 and $250 of the payment has been effectively subsidized by 
the federal government.25    
This note, in Part II, explains the challenges in influencing and regulating the 
extra-territorial acts and omissions of American MNCs and their foreign suppliers. 
Part III. A.  discusses some of the most pressing human and labor rights abuses that 
are someway connected to American MNCs. Part III. B. begins the conversation of a 
CSR tax deduction by describing the similarities and differences of tax credits and 
deductions. Next, Part III. C. offers arguments for a tax deduction for money spent 
by American MNCs on CSR initiatives to improve human and labor rights, and 
                                                          
 19 See generally Larry Catá Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The 
United Nation’s Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger 
of Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 37 COLUM. HUMAN RTS L. REV.  287, 
289 (2006). 
 20 See id. 
 21 See Williams, supra note 8. For additional commentary on William’s note see 
CORPORATE 0GOVERNANCE: LAW, THEORY AND POLICY 30-38 (Thomas W. Joo 
eds., 2010).  
 22 I.R.C. § 170(a)(1).    
 23 See JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND 
POLICY 57 (3d ed. 2004) (“a core principal is that only deductions specifically granted by the 
Code are allowable. One often reads in judicial opinions that deduction provisions in the Code 
are a matter of legislative grace and thus are to be strictly construed against the taxpayer.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted ).      
 24 I.R.C. § 221(a), (b).  
 25 See Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate Giving: Tax Expenditures, The Nature 
of the Corporation, and The Social Construction of Charity, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 32, 33 
(1994) for an example using the section 170 charitable deduction.    
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environmental protection. Counter-arguments against such a deduction are 
considered in Part III.  D.  Finally Part IV. concludes the Note.  
II.  BACKGROUND—REGULATING AMERICAN MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS’ FOREIGN ACTIVITIES 
A.  The Shareholder versus Stakeholder Corporate Governance Model Debate 
Since corporations are people too (legally speaking), should corporations care if 
their operations harm other people or the environment in places where their wealth is 
generated? Should corporations feel obligated to take steps toward lowering their 
carbon footprint? Prevent labor and human rights abuses in their supply chain? 
Though the debate is ongoing, many MNCs now voluntarily allocate a portion of 
their corporate earnings to CSR programs to do just that.26 
Traditionally MNCs have implemented CSR initiatives for a myriad of reasons, 
not the least of which is the continued economic success of their enterprise.27 Despite 
substantial research into expanding the regulations governing MNCs’ overseas 
activities, the current economic stagnation and political gridlock makes it doubtful 
that any perceived anti-business regulations (such as a law mandating CSR 
spending) could make it through Congress unscathed. Only recently has the 
discussion regarding the role of tax law in the CSR sphere started to coalesce, 
however the research to date is inadequate.28 Much of the research regarding taxation 
in the CSR context is focused on the question of whether tax avoidance strategies are 
socially responsible.29 I believe that a corporate tax deduction for CSR spending 
should be palatable to both sides of the aisle, if the deduction does not appreciably 
increase the national deficit.  
A useful place to begin is a review of historical competing corporate governance 
theories regarding the duties and obligations of a corporation. In their famous long-
running debate, Professors Adolph Berle and E. Merrick Dodd offered seemingly 
opposite views regarding the obligations of corporations. Berle’s viewpoint was that 
a corporation’s only duty was to increase shareholder wealth.30 Berle’s argument 
                                                          
 26 See Nancy Hatch Woodward, Corporate Social Responsibility May Prove To Be 
Recession Proof and Smarter Than Ever, 28 No. 3 Emp. Alert 2 (citing Santiago Zorzopulos 
Reich, senior consultant with the Ethical Leadership Group, “Now that a recession has 
happened, we are no longer just theorizing that CSR supports business initiatives;  we have to 
prove that it contributes to the success of the enterprise…We are seeing expansion and growth 
in these programs at a time we aren't seeing it in most other corporate initiatives.”); see also 
Arthur Acevedo, Responsible Profitability? Not on My Balance Sheet!, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 
651, 652, 653 (2012).  
 27 See Woodward, supra note 26, at 1 (listing cost saving, efficiency, and access to 
socially responsible investors as elements of the business case for CSR).  
 28 See Acevedo, supra note 26, at 693; see also Matthew Genasci & Sarah Pray, 
Symposium, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Extractive Industries: Yale Law School, 
March 8, 2008: Article: Extracting Accountability: The Implications of the Resource Curse for 
CSR Theory and Practice, 11 YALE HUM. RITS. & DEV L.J. 37, 55-58 (2008) (addressing the 
need for further discussion of tax law in the context of CSR).  
 29 See Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, CSR and Taxation: The Missing Link, 
Harvard Business School Faculty & Research, (Oct. 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=21456. 
 30 Backer, supra note 19, at 298. 
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held sway for the better portion of the last century.31 Dodd, however, argued that 
corporations have a greater role to play in society.32 Berle’s argument was 
championed by Professor Milton Friedman, who argued that since corporations are 
not state actors, their regulation ought to focus on monetary policy rather than a 
corporation’s purported social policy functions.33 As a result of the dominance of the 
profit maximization (shareholder primacy) model, globalization in the late twentieth 
century triggered what has been referred to as the race to the bottom.34 On the other 
hand, according to Amir Licht, the debate between Dodd and Berle was not as 
simple as described above.35 In his reading of the debate, Berle did not dispute 
Dodd’s assertion that non-shareholders and shareholders could be beneficiaries of 
corporate fiduciary duties.36 The disagreement, however, centered on whether and 
how corporate directors could take their concerns for non-shareholders into account 
while still fulfilling their ultimate fiduciary duties to investors.37   
B.  Applying U.S. Domestic Laws Abroad 
1.  American Banana Fruit Co. v. Dole Fruit Co. 
Attempts to control the extraterritorial activities of American MNCs through 
U.S. domestic legislation have proven daunting ever since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.38  In American Banana, the 
Court ruled that the Sherman Antitrust Act did not apply to acts outside of the U.S.; 
“the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or 
unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is 
                                                          
 31 Id.  
 32 Id. at 299 (“As such, corporations might be made to serve other constituencies, or might 
seek to serve such constituencies within a broader context than that of mere shareholder profit 
maximization.”).   
 33 Id. at 299, 300.  
 34 See Acevedo, supra note 26, at 656 (explaining that MNCs competed fiercely to 
establish their brands in the global marketplace by expanding operations to developing nations 
with lax human and labor rights standards). 
 35 See Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and 
Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 652 (2004) (questioning the entire debate between 
the shareholder primacy and stakeholder views of corporate governance.  Licht attacks the 
nearly universally accepted notion that corporations only have to identify its residual 
claimants to determine which interest the directors should seek to maximize, “[a] more 
sensible analysis reflected in modern economic theory of the firm-acknowledges that the 
corporate enterprise comprises several constituencies whose interests are both interdependent 
and intermediate.”). 
 36 Id. at 652.   
 37 Id.  
 38 Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
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done.”39 The result of American Banana has been a strong legislative and judicial 
presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S. law.40  
2.  The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 
Despite the effect of the American Banana decision, the U.S. has passed 
domestic legislation to combat perceived moral ills in foreign nations, notably in the 
form of embargoes and sanctions.41 It is fair to say that in many instances, sanctions 
and embargoes have only been directed at the U.S.’ political foes; for example 
nations aligned with the former Soviet Union during the cold war.42 An exception to 
the paradigm was Congress’ enactment of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 
1986.43 The Act was passed with strong bipartisan support overriding President 
Reagan’s veto.44 The act placed severe trade restrictions on American MNCs 
conducting business with the racist South African regime during the reign of 
apartheid.45 The anti-apartheid movement did not begin on Capitol Hill though. 
Congress only became involved after substantial grass roots activism by university 
students, NGOs, and religious leaders. Apartheid was able to galvanize the 
condemnation of the American electorate in ways that current human and labor 
rights abuses have not. Resultantly, American politicians have not been pressured by 
voters to take a tougher stance on current human and labor rights violations.    
3.  The Alien Tort Statute 
Another check on MNCs’ seemingly unfettered power in developing nations is to 
allow foreign nationals to bring claims against MNCs in U.S. courts under the Alien 
                                                          
 39 Id. at 355 (the Court was worried that applying U.S. domestic laws extraterritoriality 
would violate the sovereignty norm of international law).   
 40 See Westfield, supra note 14, at 1087. 
 41 See, e.g., Andrew Mihalik, The Cuban Embargo: A Ship Weathering the Storm of 
Globalization and International Trade, 12 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 98 (2003) (discussing 
the fifty-year old Cuban embargo, with arguments offered for and against its continuation). 
 42 The bulk of the current sanctions and embargoes are directed at deemed state sponsors 
of terrorism (Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria) and nations that have used their military on their 
own populations, including China, Burma, and North Korea. The list of current state sponsors 
of terrorism is available at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/ c14151.htm. A list of current defense 
related embargoes is available at http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/embargoed_countries/ 
index.html.  
 43 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086 (1986) 
(codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151, 2346(d), 5001-5116 (Supp. IV. 1986)).  
 44 Steven V. Roberts, Senate, 78 to 21,Overrides Reagan’s Veto and Imposes Sanctions on 
South Africa, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1986, http://www.nytimes.com/1986/10/03/ 
politics/03REAG.html. 
 45 See Joseph L. Miljak, Forcing Sovereign Conformity: The Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act of 1986, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 261 (1988) (concluding, shortly after the passage 
of the act, that while legitimate under international law, the act would not be able to pressure 
the apartheid regime to reverse its segregationist policies. Thankfully that prediction turned 
out to be erroneous).   
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Tort Statute (ATS).46 The ATS was enacted as part of the historical Judiciary Act of 
1789. The purported goal of the ATS was to assure European nations that American 
courts were willing and able to prosecute crimes at sea, thus protecting commerce 
between the new nation and the old world.47 The ATS was largely unused until a 
wave of plaintiffs brought claims under the doctrine in the 1980s against “war 
criminals, dictators, and terrorists for torture, slavery, genocide, and other egregious 
acts.”48 The cases were allowed to proceed under the auspices of “customary 
international law.”49 The Supreme Court did not hear a case brought under the ATS 
until it decided Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain in 2004.50 In Sosa, the Court ruled that the 
ATS was jurisdictional in nature and did not give rise to a new cause of action.51 
After Sosa, all new claims brought under the ATS must be premised on international 
legal norms that are universal, specific, and concrete.52 Potential plaintiffs face an 
uphill battle bringing claims under ATS unless and until test until there is greater 
international consensus regarding, environmental, human and labor rights.53  
C.  International Treaties and Compacts 
International treaties and agreements have helped propel the debate for 
international recognition of human and labor rights, however, both are marred by 
their voluntariness and unenforceability.54 Further, Congress is under constant 
pressure from MNCs and their lobbyists not to ratify treaties or pledges that could 
negatively impact corporate profits.55 For example, the U.S. is the only industrialized 
nation that has not recognized the United Nation’s Convention on the Rights of the 
Child.56 The International Labour Organization (ILO) is the U.N.’s agency tasked 
with improving international working standards. Despite having over 180 members 
                                                          
 46 28 U.S.C. §1350. See Waldref, supra note 16, at 166, 167 (The ATS states the 
following: “The district courts shall have jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort 
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”). 
 47 Id. at 163.  
 48 Id.  
 49 Id.; see also JEFFREY DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 
81-87 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), where the 
Supreme Court held that by the general consent of civilized nations, independent of any 
express treaty,  it is a violation of international law to seize coastal fishing vessels as prizes of 
war.).  
 50 Waldref, supra note 16, at 165, 166.  
 51 Id. The Court ruled that federal courts should not recognize claims under the ATS that 
were not understood as violations of the laws of nations by the “First Congress.”   
 52 Id.  
 53 Id.  
 54 See, e.g., Baines, supra note 15, at 225-28 (discussing the Equator Principles and the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises).  
 55 See Dunoff, supra note 49, at 204-222.  
 56 See Shima Baradaran & Stephanie Barclay, Fair Trade and Child Labor, 43 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L REV. 1, 8 (the only other U.N. member state not to ratify the convention is 
Somalia).   
10 THE GLOBAL BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:1 
 
 
in the organization, ILO Convention No. 15, Convention Concerning the 
Occupational Safety and Health and the Working Environment, only had fifty-six 
signatories as of 2010.57  The U.N. Conference on Trade and Developed (UNCTAD) 
attempted to control MNCs offshore operations when it produced its Draft Code of 
Conduct on Transnational Corporations. Article 14 of the Draft Code would have 
required that MNCs respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms in countries 
where they operate.58 Ultimately the Draft Code was never adopted by the U.N. 
General Assembly. Though voluntary, the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development’s (OCED) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises have been 
given serious treatment in the international community.59 
D.  The Emergence of Voluntary Corporate Social Responsibility Initiatives 
CSR has grown in the vacuum of scant domestic legislation and unenforceable 
international agreements in controlling the foreign activities of American MNCs.60 
The growth in CSR acceptance was spearheaded by academics and activists in the 
fields of international law and human rights.61  CSR can be understood as voluntary 
codes of conduct pronounced by business entities to outline the entity’s standards 
and principles for conducting business.62 CSR has been noted to serve both “micro” 
and “macro” business purposes.63  On the “micro” level, CSR initiatives help 
individual business entities with “greater access to investment capital; managing 
risks and liabilities; employee recruitment, retention, and productivity/motivation; 
improved stakeholder relations; innovation; and increased business opportunities.”64 
                                                          
 57 See Dunoff, supra note 49, at 207 (“Indeed, most of the ILO conventions have relatively 
few ratifications.”). 
 58 Id. at 208.  
 59 Id. at 209-10; the Guidelines are available at http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/.  
 60 See Colin Marks & Paul S. Miller, Plato, The Prince, and Corporate Virtue: 
Philosophical Approaches to Corporate Social Responsibility, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 4 (2010) 
(the authors credit Professor Archie B. Carroll as having articulated the most often cited 
model of CSR.  According to Carroll’s model, corporations owe a legal, ethical, economic, 
and discretionary and/or philanthropic responsibility to society).  
 61 See Backer, supra note 19, at 307, 308 (“for people in these fields of law and policy, the 
traditional forms of nation-centered normative corporate regulatory systems, centered on the 
economics of shareholder wealth maximization, hold no special magic. Instead of economics 
and private law, public law and public accountability provide a better model for corporate 
regulation, which can be articulated as policy, and eventually as law. At this level, the 
domestic law framing of the issue of corporate social responsibility – the extent to which the 
corporation may or must take into account the effects of its actions on others, and the 
fundamental limitation of ultimate corporate purpose to shareholders - is increasingly rejected. 
State governance and corporate governance theory conflate in norm-making outside the 
nation-state.”).  
 62 See, e.g., Dunoff, supra note 49, at 218 (discussing the CSR policies of Nike. and the 
U.S. Fair Labor Association).  
 63 Joe W. Pitts III, Corporate Social Responsibility: Current Status and Future Evolution, 
6 RUTGERS J.L. &  PUB. POL’Y 365-66 (2009).  
 64 Id. at 365. See also Bruce Rogers, Is CSR Dead Or Just Mismanaged?, FORBES (Dec. 
11, 2012 9:05 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesinsights/2012/12/11/is-csr-dead-or-
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At the “macro” level, CSR helps legitimize the broader global marketplace under the 
banner of sustainable development.65 
Despite the growth in CSR, shareholder primacy remains as the foremost 
governing principle of American MNCs.66 The sub-prime mortgage debacle has 
shown that shareholder primacy does not always protect the best interest of a 
corporation’s shareholders or of the broader society.67 Therefore the current uptick in 
CSR consciousness does not supplant shareholder primacy. Rather it can be viewed 
as another tool of corporate directors to fulfill their essential profit producing role 
through improving their brand’s reputation.68  
Because of the delicate tightrope act MNCs have to perform, the general 
consensus of corporations and other business organizations is that CSR should 
remain voluntary rather than mandated by law.69 The American government can 
encourage voluntary CSR development by allowing tax deductions for CSR outlays 
                                                          
just-mismanaged/ (In the piece, Rogers provides results from the 2012 Rep Trak™ 100 Study 
which indicate that MNCs are not doing an adequate job managing their CSR initiatives and 
communicating the results of those initiatives to consumers, “Companies are mismanaging 
their CSR investments. It’s that simple. They do not apply the same rigor on these investments 
as they do on other core business priorities. They do not link it to their business strategy. But 
treat it like a separate initiative and investment. Companies need to reassess how to spend 
their money if they want to improve their return on investment. You don’t do CSR for the 
sake of CSR. You do CSR as part of your reputation management strategy to drive business 
growth, customer loyalty, and employee alignment.”). 
 65 Id. at 366.  
 66 Sprague, supra note 17, at 5. Sprague and Lyttle trace the shareholder primacy norm 
back to the Dodge case as discussed previously. 
 67 See id. at 7 (discussing the disastrous consequences of Lehman Brothers Inc.’s and other 
Wall Street firms’ relentless pursuit of profits through investments in sub-prime  mortgage 
instruments).   
 68 See Levine, infra note 82, at 1 (“Through adequate CSR standards and effective 
monitoring, a corporation can protect the workers who make a brand's products, and in so 
doing, the brand protects itself. Moreover, effective monitoring may yield greater knowledge 
about production supply chains and production sites, thereby helping to reduce a corporation's 
exposure to counterfeiting and illegal transshipping.”).  
 69 Ronen Shamir, Socially Responsible Private Regulation: World-Culture or World 
Capitalism?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 313, 322 (2011) (“A prescriptive or regulatory approach 
or framework-setting could undermine business commitment to CSR, while a voluntary 
approach will firmly embed sustainable good practice within a business. CSR must be 
developed from within the company; it is not a discipline that can be imposed.”). See also 
Radhika Mittal, India’s Law on Corporate Social Responsibility, CSR ASIA (Feb. 1, 2013), 
available at http://www.syntao.com/CSRNews/CSRNews_Show_EN. asp?ID=15866 
(discussing India’s Companies Bill 2011 now pending before India’s House of the Parliament. 
If passed, the law would require business entities with profits above a certain threshold to 
spend two percent of their profits earned in India on CSR initiatives within the country). For a 
scholarly analysis of India’s Companies Bill 2011, see Caroline Van Zile, India’s Mandatory 
Corporate Responsibility Proposal: Creative Capitalism Meets Created Regulation in the 
Global Market, 13 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 270, 273 (2012) (concluding that while radical, 
the measure is a rational response to major tensions in the nation’s economy).   
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for specially needed charitable works.70 As such, a tax deduction for CSR dollars 
spent on eradicating the worst forms of human and labor rights abuses in an MNC’s 
global supply chain, and lowering a MNC’s global footprint, would maintain the 
status quo of shareholder primacy while achieving laudable goals.   
III.  ANALYSIS—A TAX DEDUCTION FOR CSR INITIATIVES 
A.  Pressing Issues in Global Supply Chains and the Limited Remedies to Address 
Them 
1.  Apple’s Foxconn Woe’s 
A first step in considering a tax deduction for overseas CSR spending is deciding 
whether current domestic laws and international treaties are adequate in preventing 
human and labor rights abuses. For the most part, one would have to argue they are 
since living and working conditions have advanced in many parts of developing 
world at least partially because of the efforts of the United Nations and other non-
governmental organizations.71 There are, however, certain industries, business 
entities and nations that perform worse than others in labor and human rights 
protection.  
For example, Foxconn, the Taiwanese based manufacturer of Apple’s iPhone, 
iPad, and other hi-tech devices, has come under increased scrutiny after scores of 
suicides by its young overworked factory workers at its facilities in mainland 
China.72  A Foxconn factory worker told a reporter in early 2012, that at Foxconn 
“women work like men, and men work like animals.”73 After much bad press, Apple 
announced that it would have Foxconn’s operations audited by a third party. 
                                                          
 70 But cf.  David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, 
Information, and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221, 254-255 (2009) 
(arguing that charitable subsidies should be limited to nonprofits because extending charitable 
subsidies to for-profits would necessarily require the government to intrude in the allocation 
process, resulting in less experimentation and competition. Dean Schizer posits the intrusion 
would be necessary to prevent for-profit MNCs from using charitable subsidies to “pad their 
profits” by taking advantage of the overly broad substantive scope of the current charitable 
subsidy). In a similar vein, see also Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: 
Rethinking Corporate Social Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85 
TUL. L. REV. 983, 1025, 1026 (2011) (discussing the potential for “overstatement, inflation, or 
even outright deception” in CSR claims).  
 71 But cf. Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Rethinking Redistribution: Tax Policy in an Era 
of Rising Inequality: Redistribution via Taxation: The Limited Role of the Personal Income 
Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627 (discussing the growing gap between 
the rich and the poor in developing nations and arguing that progressive income tax regimes 
are not the optimal cure for the problem).   
 72 See Foxconn Electronics Inc.: News & Videos about Foxconn Electronics Inc., CNN, 
http://topics.cnn.com/topics/foxconn_electronics_inc (last visited Oct. 12, 2013) for a 
thorough list of news stories chronicling the alleged labor rights violations at Foxconn and the 
details of the employee suicides. 
 73 Stan Grant, Inside Story of Foxconn Shrouded in Secrecy, CNN (Feb. 6, 2012, 4:51 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/06/world/asia/foxconn-worker-difficulties/index.html. 
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Foxconn has also announced that it has increased worker’s salaries. Yet despite these 
efforts, allegations of harsh working conditions to flourish seemingly unabated.74 
2.  Bitter Sweet Chocolate 
Agriculture is another area where MNCs are indirectly connected to labor and 
human rights violations.75  Labor intensive crops such as tobacco are often produced 
by young teens, to the detriment of their health and education prospects.76 The vast 
majority of chocolate consumed by Americans (and the rest of the world) and sold 
by American MNCs is produced from cocoa grown in West Africa, particularly in 
the Cote d’Ivoire.77 Cocoa production is an extremely labor intensive effort, and 
reports indicate that over 600,000 children were involved in cocoa production in the 
Cote d’Ivoire alone in 2002, many of which are victims of human trafficking and 
forced employment.78  
3.  Freeport’s Troubles Grasberg Mine 
The mineral extraction industry is not immune either. The Grasberg Mine, 
containing the world’s largest gold deposits and third largest copper reserves, has 
been the site of under reported environmental degradation and cyclical violence.79  
The mine is located in West Papua, officially the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya. 
The mine is operated by the American MNC Freeport-McMoran Inc., with security 
unofficially supplied by local police and often the brutally efficient Indonesian 
army.80 West Papuans, who have a different language, religion, and culture from 
other islands in the sprawling archipelago have resented Indonesian rule ever since 
the former incorporated the province following Indonesia’s independence from 
Dutch colonial rule. Freeport and the Indonesian government have been accused of 
                                                          
 74 See Susan Adams, Apple’s New Foxconn Embarrassment, FORBES (Sep. 12, 2012, 2:38 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/2012/09/12/apples-new-foxconn-
embarrassment/ (discussing the deplorable working conditions at Foxconn plants throughout 
China and recent allegations that teachers forced vocational students to work on Foxconn 
assembly lines to make up for a labor shortage in the wake of orders for the iPhone5).  
 75 See Armin Rosencranz et al., Farming and Food: How We Grow What We Eat: Doling 
Out Environmental Justice to Nicaraguan Banana Workers: The Jose Adolfo Tellez v. Dole 
Food Company Litigation in U.S. Courts, 3 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 161 (2009); 
Baradaran, supra note 56, at 11 (“A study conducted by Human Rights Watch also discovered 
that agricultural laborers often must work without access to sanitary drinking water, hand 
washing, and toilet facilities, all of which contribute to pesticide poisoning, infection, 
dehydration, and other illnesses.”).  
 76 Baradaran, supra note 56, at 11-12. 
 77 Id. at 12-13. 
 78  Id. at 13. 
 79 See Anastasia Khokhryakova, Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc.: Liability of a Private 
Actor for an International Environmental Tort Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 9 COLO. J. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 463 (1998).   
 80 For an up-to-date report of the violent clashes between security forces and the 
indigenous tribes affected by the Grasberg mine see Freeport-McMoRan, WEST PAUPA MEDIA 
ALERTS, http://www.westpapuamedia.info/tag/ freeport-mcmoran/. 
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murder, torture, and poisoning rivers in connection with the operations at the mine 
and quelling local (frequently violent) protest.81  
4.  Limited Patience for Additional Regulation 
Regulations could be put into place on a nation by nation or industry by industry 
specific basis to prevent human and/or labor abuses. A suitable rule to combat the 
Foxconns and Freeports of the world would be to place a tariff on digital products or 
mineral resources produced in inhumane working conditions, or in a manner that is 
environmentally destructive. In the face of such a tariff, American MNCs would 
surely take a more pro-active role in controlling the practices of foreign vendors to 
avoid the tariff. However, as stated previously, the current political climate and stiff 
competition from foreign competing firms effectively rule out further regulation in 
this area. 
5.  “Fair Trade” Labeling  
The use of “Fair Trade” labeling in the agricultural sector has been shown to 
have an extremely powerful impact on coffee and tea producers in several sub-
Saharan African nations including Malawi and Ghana. Consumers in Europe have 
shown a willingness to pay a moderate premium for agricultural products that have 
been produced in a socially responsible manner; studies indicate that American 
consumers would do likewise.82 American MNCs in the agricultural sector should be 
encouraged to purchase a certain percentage of their crops from Fair Trade suppliers.  
B.  An Overview of Tax Credits and Deductions 
Allowing MNCs to take a tax deduction for corporate profits spent on certain 
CSR initiatives would allow American MNCs to improve the working and living 
conditions in nations where they derive wealth. Tax deductions work by subtracting 
the amount allowable for the deduction from the gross income of the taxpayer. The 
taxpayer’s adjusted gross income (AGI) is then multiplied by the taxpayer’s 
marginal tax rate to determine the taxpayer’s tax liability. Tax deductions are similar 
to tax credits; however tax credits operate at the end of the calculation by offsetting 
the amount of the tax credit, dollar-for-dollar, against the amount of tax owed.83  
                                                          
 81 Khokhryakova, supra note 79, at 472.  
 82 Baradaran, supra note 56, at 39 citing Patrick De Pelsmacker et al., Do Consumers Care 
About Ethics? Willingness to Pay for Fair Trade Coffee, 39 J. CONSUMER AFF. 363-64 (2005); 
see also CAROLE BASRI, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE PRACTICE: A 
PRACTIONER’S GUIDE TO GLOBAL SUCCESS 7-45 (2008) (discussing the work of TransFair 
USA, a certifier of fair trade products in the United States, “TransFair is a member of 
Fairtrade Labeling Organizations International (FLO). FLO is a consortium of fair trade 
groups in Japan, Canada, the United States, and seventeen European countries.  TransFair 
audits transactions between U.S. companies and their suppliers in order to guarantee that the 
farmers and farm workers are paid a fair, above-market price. In addition, FLO conducts 
annual inspections to ensure that strict socioeconomic development criteria are being met 
using the increased fairtrade revenues.  TransFair then permits those products to bear a Fair 
Trade Certified™ label. Moreover, TransFair maintains a list of producers of Fair Trade 
products. One example is Starbucks' Fair Trade Blend coffee.”). 
 83 See Tax Benefits for Education: Information Center, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-
Benefits-for-Education:-Information-Center (last visited Oct. 12, 2013). 
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American MNCs, if offered, would prefer a tax credit over a tax deduction 
because tax credits are more valuable to high income taxpayers. However a tax 
deduction would allow more tax revenue to ultimately flow to the U.S. government, 
while achieving the intended goal of increasing spending on CSR. While allowing a 
tax deduction for CSR spending does not necessarily prove that MNCs that 
otherwise would have no intention of implementing CSR will suddenly decide to 
implement a policy, the available evidence shows that the percentage of MNCs 
voluntarily implementing CSR policies has increased steadily. Thus allowing a tax 
deduction for CSR spending is highly likely to influence MNCs to consider other 
constituencies as well shareholder profits.84  
C.  Why CSR Initiatives Deserve Favorable Tax Treatment 
1.  Substance over Form 
The statutes authorizing tax exempt status to nonprofit entities are located in 
subchapter F of the I.R.C.85  In order for an entity to be entitled to the benefits of tax 
exempt status (and for the entity’s donors to be entitled to a tax deduction)86, the 
entity must be one of the types listed in section 501(c)(3).87 Entities entitled to tax 
exempt treatment under section 501(c)(3) are taxed, however, on business activities 
that are not “substantially related to an organization’s charitable purpose.”88 Anup 
Malani and Eric A. Posner made a compelling argument for the extension of tax 
                                                          
 84 See Marks, supra note 60, at 1 (citing Robert Reich in 2007 discussing the increase in 
corporate acceptance of CSR, “over 80 percent of corporate recruiters say business school 
graduates should display an awareness and knowledge of CSR. Hundreds of corporate 
conferences are held on it annually. Tens of thousands of corporate executives listen 
attentively to consultants who specialize in it explain its importance. The world's top CEOs 
and officials, gathering annually at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, 
solemnly discuss it and proclaim their commitment to it.”). 
 85 26 U.S.C. Chapter 1, Subchapter F – Exempt Organizations.   
 86 See JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND 
POLICY 373 (4th ed. 2011) (for a discussion of whether the charitable deduction is justified. 
The authors posit that although the  “ability-to-pay tax norm would  indicate that a person’s 
charitable donations were available to finance the federal government, and therefore should 
not be deductible. However, the ability-to-pay norm is based on a political theory that can 
accommodate the charitable domain. The U.S. government and charities both serve to promote 
the public good, and both conform to the same triadic structure: (1) contributors, (2) a 
mediating institution administered by accountable agents, and (3) a class of beneficiaries.”). 
 87 See Boris Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, Exempt Organizations-In General, in FED. 
TAX’N OF INCOME EST. & GIFTS, (Thompson/RIA 2012).  The list includes charitable 
institutions, religious organizations, colleges and other entities whose principal purpose is to 
benefit others rather than the entity or an entity’s investors.  
 88 Kalle Condliffe, Balancing the Equities: Considering the “Flip-Side” of the UBIT and 
Forming a Workable Solution, 6 BROOK J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 211, 213 (2011). The 
Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT) is codified at 26 U.S.C. § 511. The UBIT taxes 
charitable organizations on income received that is unrelated to the charitable purpose of the 
entity.   
16 THE GLOBAL BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:1 
 
 
exemptions to for-profit charities.89 Currently for-profit charities are not entitled to 
valuable tax exemptions, and donations made to for-profit charities are not 
deductible in the United States.90 The principal reason for the disparate treatment is a 
restriction referred to as the “non-distribution constraint.” The crux of the non-
distribution constraint is that 501(c)(3) entities are prohibited from distributing 
excess profits (net revenue less expenses) to persons who exercise control over the 
entity; additionally employees’ must be paid a fixed salary and cannot share in the 
entity’s profits.91  
Malani and Posner argue against “coupling” the 501(c)(3) tax benefit to the form 
of the entity as nonprofit versus for-profit. The authors list and forcefully criticize 
three explanations for why nonprofits are given special tax treatment compared to 
for-profit firms, namely 1. the public goods theory; 2. the agency theory; and 3. the 
altruism theory.92 According to the public goods theory, people are encouraged to 
donate to charities because their donations are tax deductible. In turn, the charities 
use the donations to produce “public goods” (i.e. meals for the hungry or coats for 
disadvantage youths) or to perform services that are deemed socially desirable in a 
manner that is more efficient than if the government produced identical “public 
goods” or performed identical services with tax revenues.93 The agency theory 
suggests that limiting tax exempt status to nonprofit entities protects donors who 
otherwise could not adequately measure the quality of charitable services of an entity 
with a profit-motive.94  Lastly the altruism theory holds that more public goods are 
created by nonprofits; and because nonprofits attract employees and leaders who are 
altruistic, a higher percentage of donations are directly passed to the entity’s 
charitable beneficiaries in the form of “public goods.”95 Ultimately Malani and 
Posner conclude that “coupling” the tax break to the entity’s form distorts 
entrepreneur’s incentives and encourages inefficient production of “public goods.”96 
My argument is not as broad sweeping as Malani’s and Posner’s in that I am only 
advocating for a tax deduction for American MNCs that spend a portion of their 
profits on targeted CSR initiatives such as poverty eradication and other socially 
desirable outcomes. I   posit that American MNCs can and do produce “public 
                                                          
 89 See Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 
2017 (2007). Recall that 501(c)(3) entities are exempt from corporate income tax, and their 
donors are entitled to a tax deduction under section 170.   
 90 See id. at 2019.  
 91 Id. at 2018; see also Dana Brakman Reiser, Charity Law’s Essentials, 86 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 2 (2002) (explaining the tension between an entity’s charitable mission and the 
inability of donors to adequately police the quality of the entity’s performance. “Current 
charity law embodies this rule and the slightly more general idea that charities must use their 
assets to benefit some charitable class. This requirement…focuses charities…by declaring 
self-regarding behavior unacceptable.”).  
 92 Malani & Posner, supra note 89, at 2020, 2021. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id.  
 96 Id. at 2066 (“The relevant consideration for the law is not whether the entrepreneur is 
altruistic but whether the effect of the entrepreneur’s action is socially beneficial.”).  
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goods” in developing nations at least as efficiently as nonprofit entities. For 
example, Google’s philanthropic activities are carried out through a division of the 
firm rather than through donations to nonprofits.97 American Microfinance 
Institutions (MFIs) have provided loans to many economically challenged 
entrepreneurs who otherwise would have been turned away by traditional banks 
because of the borrower’s lack of collateral.98 Currently most MFIs operate as 
nonprofits; resultantly they face crippling hurdles in their efforts to obtain capital to 
make loans. Michelle Scholastica Paul argued that American MFIs serve as a conduit 
for the redistribution of wealth from the haves to the have-nots, regardless of 
whether they operate as a nonprofit or for-profit entity. Thus, because the needy 
borrower still received a loan they would not have received from a traditional bank, 
for-profit MFIs should be entitled to similar tax exemptions as nonprofits.99  
Although Google (and other huge conglomerates) and a small start-up for-profit 
MFI have drastically different economic resources, they both can help reduce human 
and labor rights violations through their charitable CSR initiatives in developing 
nations. Therefore I see no reason why American MNCs that voluntary spend profits 
on socially desirable CSR initiatives should not receive some form of tax deduction. 
The tax deduction would incentivize American MNCs to behave responsibly, thus 
increasing the potential beneficiaries of the entity’s resources; while simultaneously 
relieving some of the burden placed on the shareholders with respect to foregone 
profits.  
2.  More CSR, Less USAID? 
A review of the U.S. government’s foreign aid expenditures and policy lends 
further support for allowing a CSR tax deduction. In the Obama administration’s 
proposed budget for fiscal year 2013, $54.87 billion dollars were requested for State, 
Foreign Operations and Related Programs appropriations.100  Ultimately the Senate 
approved $52.1 billion in spending.101 The bill includes $1.45 billion dollars for the 
U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID operations and 
administration.102 USAID was created under the leadership of President John F. 
                                                          
 97 Reiser, supra note 91, at 2.  
 98 See Zahir Virani, American Microfinance, Opportunities and Challenges, 27 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 370 (2008), see also Michelle Scholastica Paul, Bridging the Gap to the 
Microfinance Promise: A Proposal for a Tax-Exempt Microfinance Hybrid Entity, 42 N.Y.U. 
J. INT’L L. & POL. 1383 (2010).  
 99 See Paul, supra note 98, at 1392-1417. 
 100 SUSAN B. EPSTEIN ET AL., CONG RESEARCH SERV., R4261, STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, 
& RELATED PROGRAMS: FY2013 BUDGET & APPROPRIATIONS (2012).  The figure is roughly 
1.5% of the total federal budget.  State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs is a 
subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations tasked with 
funding a broad range of overseas initiatives, including diplomatic missions, foreign military 
aid and United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The Senate has a 
complementary subcommittee which performs virtually identical functions. 
 101 Press Release, U.S. Comm. on Appropriations, Summary: State, Foreign Operations 
Subcommittee (May 24, 2012) (on file with author).  
 102 Id.  
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Kennedy after the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.103 As of 2012, 
USAID operated approximately 11,097 projects in the developing world.104 If an 
American MNC can facilitate a program that is being funded through USAID’s tax 
dollars105, the MNC should be allowed to operate the program. The MNC should be 
given a tax deduction for the funds spent carrying out the project. As previously 
stated, it would cost U.S. taxpayer’s less to allow the MNC the deduction than it 
would be to pay for the government performing the same function.  
D.  Arguments against a CSR Tax Deduction 
1.  Deduction’s Deplete the Fisc 
One of the strongest and newest arguments against allowing a tax deduction for 
CSR spending (and even current section deductions) is the sky-rocketing national 
debt and the impending fiscal cliff. As far back as 2009, the Obama administration 
began a push to reduce the amount deductible for charitable contributions as a means 
to raise revenues.106 Limited to the context of CSR spending in developing nations, I 
propose that rather than scaling back the charitable deduction, the U.S. government 
could reduce foreign aid in situations where American MNCs provide comparable 
charity.  
For example, if Congress allotted $X of foreign aid for mosquito nets in an 
impoverished nation ridden with malaria, and an American MNC operating in the 
nation could provide the nets through a CSR initiative, Congress could reallocate the 
funds from U.S. Aid that were designated for the project or use the saved funds to 
pay down the debt.107 Allowing the MNC a tax deduction in this scenario would 
actually increase rather than deplete the treasury. The reason for this is that while 
foreign aid removes money from the treasury dollar for dollar, the tax deduction 
allowed to the MNC would only result in lowering the MNC’s tax burden by a 
certain percentage of the cost of the CSR outlay.108 It is common knowledge that vast 
sums of foreign aid do not reach the intended beneficiaries because of corrupt heads 
of state in developing nations. Therefore, instead of doling out American tax dollars 
to kleptocrats, American MNCs should be allowed a tax deduction if they can carry 
out the Congressional intent of the foreign aid expenditure at a net cost savings.  
                                                          
 103 USAID History, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV. (Oct. 29, 2012, 2:15 PM), http://ww. 
usaid.gov/who-we-are/usaid-history.  
 104 USAID Where We Work, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV. (Oct. 29, 2012, 2:20 PM), 
http://map.usaid.gov/. 
 105 Assuming the MNC can meet the benchmarks set for the program by USAID. 
 106 Schizer, supra note 70, at 223.   
 107 Of course American MNCs could not replace U.S. governmental aid with respect to the 
defense industry. 
 108 Consider a foreign aid project that would cost the government $1 million to provide 
Polio vaccinations in Haiti. If an American MNC provided the vaccines, the government 
would initially save the entire $1 million. When the MNC is allowed a tax deduction, the 
MNC’s tax liability would only be decreased by a percentage of the $1 million spent 
($350,000 if the MNC was in the 35% marginal rate bracket) rather than the whole amount. In 
the end, the same charitable goal has been accomplished at a discounted price to the American 
taxpayers and the MNC. 
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Kalle Condliffe argues against extending Malani’s and Posner’s proposed for-
profit tax exemption policy to CSR initiatives.109 Condliffe’s argument is that 
exempting CSR activities would likely “severely erode the tax base.”110 Using the 
example of Starbuck’s “Coffee and Farmer Equity Practices,” which decrease labor 
and human rights abuses and combat poverty, Condliffe concludes that all of the 
income generated by the sale of Starbucks coffee would be tax exempt.111 I disagree 
with Condliffe’s expansive interpretation of Malani’s and Posner’s proposal. Rather 
than exempting all of Starbucks’ income from selling “Fairtrade” coffee, I merely 
propose allowing a tax deduction for the premium amount that Starbuck’s spent on 
the CSR effort to purchase “Fairtrade” coffee rather than irresponsibly grown coffee. 
As such the deduction I am proposing would offset the added cost shouldered by 
American MNCs (and their investors) to prevent human and labor rights violations, 
and environmental degradation from occurring in their supply chain.  
Professor Nancy Knauer argued against viewing the section 170 corporate 
charitable deduction as a tax expenditure (forgone revenue).112  Professor Knauer 
reasoned that because corporate giving is the functional equivalent of advertising and 
public relations expenditures, the section 170 deduction acts as a normative 
adjustment rather than a tax expenditure.113 The thrust of Professor Knauer’s 
argument is that corporate charitable contributions are essentially disguised 
purchases of advertising or goodwill from section 501(c)(3) entities.114 Resultantly 
the receipt of the disguised purchase should trigger the UBIT115 because selling 
advertisement is not related to a charitable purpose.116 
My perspective (limited indeed) is that Professor Knauer’s hypothesis hinges on 
the belief that all corporate transfers to charity are made public thus allowing the 
corporation to enjoy the benefits of the “halo effect.”117 Though admittedly routine, it 
must be the case that many corporations make charitable donations without the 
expectation of a quid pro quo benefit in the form of enhanced brand image. A 
deduction for CSR initiatives is less likely to result in a disguised purchase of 
goodwill because the beneficiary will not be a well-known 501(c)(3) entity. It is 
doubtful that any potential investor or customer would know if Freeport McMoran 
implemented a CSR policy to build clinics in the rural villages of West Papua, or 
utilized “greener,” but more expensive extraction methods unless the company made 
an overt act to publicize the initiative.  Thus a tax deduction for certain CSR 
initiatives is less susceptible to the sort of subterfuge singled out by Professor 
Knauer if the CSR initiative is implemented discreetly.  
                                                          
 109 Condliffe, supra note 88, at 226. 
 110 Id.  
 111 Id.  
 112 See Knauer, supra note 25, at 88-94. 
 113 Id. at 88. 
 114 Id. at 96-97.  
 115 See Condliffe, supra note 88.   
 116 Knauer, supra note 25, at 97.  
 117 In this context the “halo effect” is the enhanced public image corporations obtain when 
consumers learn about a given charitable contribution made by the corporation.  
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2.  The Problem of “Greenwashing” 
Another hurdle would be to prevent entities from obtaining a CSR tax deduction 
for good works in one area, while simultaneously acting grossly irresponsible in 
another. An example would be an MNC that profited from sweatshop labor, but 
decided to help build a neighborhood playground for its workers children. In order to 
prevent MNCs from engaging in this sort of “Greenwashing,” the deduction should 
be limited to MNCs that are not currently connected to human or labor rights 
violations, or extreme environmental destruction. The restriction would require 
American MNCs to take a harder look at every aspect of their global supply chain if 
it wishes to receive the deduction. The guidelines for obtaining the deduction would 
need to be written into the statute authorizing the deduction, as is already the case for 
every tax deduction. The economic burden of establishing the entities adherence to 
human and labor rights norms and ecological principles should rest with the MNC. I 
suggest requiring the MNC to pay a fee to the appropriate government agency118 
commensurate with the agency’s labor expenses to process the MNC’s CSR 
deduction request. 
3.  Waning Support for the Section 170 Corporate Deduction 
Scholars who oppose the section 170 corporate charitable deduction are not 
likely to support extending favorable tax treatment to charitable CSR initiatives. The 
section 170 deduction, as applied to corporate donations, has been the subject of 
scorn since its enactment. Much of the criticism revolves around the revenue 
depleting effect of the deduction.119  Prior to the enactment of the section 170 
corporate deduction, courts faced with shareholder challenges to corporate donations 
would limit the donations to gifts that were made to financially benefit the 
corporation.120 If corporate directors could show that a donation was an ordinary and 
necessary business expense, courts would refrain from second guessing their 
decision.121  
Ultimately Professor Lashbrooke concluded that the section 170 deduction for 
corporations is misguided because it allows corporations to choose which social 
welfare policies to support, a decision which he preferred was left entirely to the 
federal government.122  I do not see a reason to believe that our politicians are any 
better off than corporate directors in deciding which social causes are more 
deserving of financial support. At this point it is common knowledge that politicians 
routinely inflate appropriations bills with pork barrel spending projects to benefit 
their own power base. Why should the government have a monopoly in this area? 
                                                          
 118 As with other deductions, the discretion to approve or deny the deduction must be left 
with the Treasury Department, hence the IRS. 
 119 See E.C. Lashbrooke, Jr., Internal Revenue Code Section 170 & the Great Corporate 
Giveaway, 22 PAC. L. J. 221-22 (1991) (“Given the state of the federal budget and the now 
express need to raise taxes, we [cannot] afford to continue to let as much as $1.7 billion 
dollars annually leak out of the federal treasury through the section 170 corporate charitable 
deduction.”).  
 120 Id. at 223.   
 121 Id. at 224 (citing Corning Glass Works v. Lucas, 37 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1929)).   
 122 Id. at 248.   
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Corporations, and other persons, deserve the opportunity to replace costly public 
welfare with deductible charitable contributions irrespective of whether the 
contribution is made to a section 501(c) entity or directly to beneficiaries through an 
MNCs’ CSR initiative. 
4.  Potential Conflicts with Section 162 
There has been a fair amount of academic debate regarding whether the section 
170 deduction for corporate charitable contributions should be replaced with the 
section 162 deduction for ordinary and necessary business expense deduction.123 
Professor Linda Sugin argued that the section 170 deduction is biased in favor of 
corporate charitable donations when compared with donations by individual 
shareholders following corporate distributions.124 According to Professor Sugin, 
switching to the section 162 deduction would reduce agency costs by requiring 
donations to serve a legitimate business-related purpose, and make charity law more 
consistent with public perception and system of corporate double taxation.125  
An additional problem with replacing the section 170 deduction with a deduction 
under section 162 highlighted by Professor Sugin is the issue of timing the 
deduction.126 Under section 170, charitable donations are deductible in the year that 
they are made. Section 162 deductions, however, may have to be capitalized under 
section 263.127  The section 170 deduction requires that the donation is made without 
seeking a quid pro quo benefit from the recipient. Section 162, however, is expressly 
designated for “ordinary and necessary business expenses.” Therefore I do not think 
it would be helpful to completely replace the section 170 deduction with section 162 
in the absence of treasury regulations explaining when the corporation would be 
entitled to deduct a specific contribution. Even a CSR initiative would face trouble 
getting around the section 263 capitalization requirement if the section 170 corporate 
charitable contribution was discarded.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
A tax deduction for CSR spending initiatives by American MNCs is justifiable 
under the same rationale as the current charitable deduction. In both instances, 
needed funds or services are transferred by those better off to needy individuals. It is 
                                                          
 123 Linda Sugin, Encouraging Corporate Charity, 26 VA. TAX L. REV. 125, 167 (2006).   
 124 Id. at 129 (“In a system with a separate corporate tax, a charitable contribution made by 
a corporation and deducted at the corporate level can generally be larger than a contribution 
that an individual shareholder can make out of a corporate distribution of the same available 
funds because the corporate tax burdens the funds distributed to shareholders, but not the 
funds contributed to charity.”).    
 125 Id. at 167. 
 126 See id. at 170-78.  
 127 Id. at 170. The capitalization requirement requires outlays known as “capital 
expenditures” to be capitalized rather than deductible if the taxpayer will enjoy an economic 
benefit from the expenditure that will last beyond the current taxable year. For instance, if 
Walmart purchases a fleet of new Freightliner tractors, Walmart would have to capitalize their 
cost pursuant to section 263 and take a section 1012 cost basis in the rigs. Each subsequent 
year Walmart will be allowed to take depreciation deductions under section 167, and its basis 
in the trucks will be reduced under  section 1016.  
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easier to justify using American tax dollars to subsidize charitable contributions 
made within the U.S., as it can be argued that the donations fill a void that would 
otherwise have to be provided through costly governmental services. But the current 
charitable deduction is available for business entities and individuals who contribute 
to international charities as well, so long as the charitable organization receiving the 
donation falls under one of the provisions of section 501(c).  
American MNCs provide considerable resources and perform charitable services 
in a multitude of developing nations where they operate through CSR initiatives. 
Extending favorable tax treatment to charitable CSR initiatives would assuredly 
increase further CSR programs in size and scope, while preserving the shareholder 
primacy norm of corporate governance. A principal roadblock for a new tax 
deduction is the sky rocketing federal deficit and the stagnate growth of the U.S. 
economy. The current charitable tax deduction has already been in President 
Obama’s sights prior to his victory in the 2012 election. Time will tell whether 
President Obama will actually push for a reduction in the charitable tax deduction in 
his second term, or whether his prior statements were merely political blustery.  
Alternatively, in the spirit of fiscal restraint, a CSR tax deduction could be 
limited to instances where the MNC can expend its own funds in the place of official 
U.S. foreign aid. The ultimate goal is the furtherance of human and labor rights 
protections, and sustainable development in the supply chains of American MNCs. 
While the average American would presumably accept that as a laudable goal, the 
question remains as to how much we are collectively willing to pay to achieve it.  
